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Abstract 
How does government ideology affect the likelihood of trusting national governments during
economic  hardship?  There  are  well  developed  economic  theories  which  indicate  that
economic hardship affects the popularity and the support in political institutions (Nannestad
& Paldam 1994,  Roth  et  al.  2011,  Roth,  Nowak-Lehman  & Otter  2013,  Lewis-Beck  &
Stegmaier 2013), but more research is needed, that studies how peoples' trust  in government
is  moderated  by  party  ideology  during  economic  hardship.  This  thesis  examines  the
relationship  between government  ideology and trust  in  national  governments  across  eight
European countries from 2005-2010. The time-series data derives from the standard European
Commission's Eurobarometer survey, The Parliament and Government Composition Database
(ParlGov),  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  OECD Social  expenditure  reference
series. The  empirical  analysis  seeks  to  explain  whether  government  ideology  has  a
moderating  effect  on  peoples'  life  satisfaction  and  trust  in  national  governments  during
economic hardship. The hypotheses build on issue ownership relating to fiscal issues and
unemployment and centre-right and social  democratic parties in government are given the
main focus. A set of hypotheses concerning political trust and government ideology is tested
empirically  on  quantitative  time  series  data  from  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden.  Christian democratic  and conservative parties are added
together in the analysis, which assesses centre-right governments level of trust vis-à-vis social
democratic governments. The results show that economic hardship causes serious legitimacy
issues for both centre-right and social democratic parties. However, centre-right government
maintains a higher level of trust when testing the effect of GDP recession separately, and the
opposite is true for social democrats when running a separate test on unemployment. Having
a liberal  government  was associated  with an increase in  trust,  but only when assessing a
situation of GDP  recession separately. 
 
Key words: Trust in national governments, party ideology, economic hardship, issue 
ownership, time series analysis. 
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Outline 
Researchers  have  not  yet  extensively  explored  whether  government  ideology  moderates
levels of trust during economic hardship. This thesis adds to the growing literature on support
for  incumbents  during  economic  hardship  by  assessing  trust  in  governments  in  eight
European countries from 2005-2010. The economic crisis starting in late 2007 constitutes an
interesting backdrop for assessing the relationship between political  trust  and government
ideology.  This thesis  aims  to  explore  whether  government  ideology  moderates  trust  in
national governments during economic hardship. By examining data from twelve spring and
autumn Eurobarometer surveys covering periods both before and after recession, we explore
which political ideology that is most likely to lose or gain legitimacy during an economic
recession. The empirical analysis assess whether peoples' level of confidence in their national
governments during recessions depended on government ideology. By using data on trust in
national  governments,  government  ideology  and  macroeconomic  variables,  the  empirical
analysis shows some general trends on how party ideology is related to trust in incumbents
during difficult times, as well as assessing the effect of high unemployment and experiencing
a GDP recession in separate tests.  In line with the established literature on support in political
institutions and macroeconomics, we hypothesise that experiencing economic hardship will
generally cause a drop in trust in national governments, except for liberal parties during GDP
recession (Nannestad & Paldam 1994, Roth et al. 2011, Roth, Nowak-Lehman & Otter 2013,
Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013, Giger & Nelson 2011). 
To begin with, the thesis scrutinises some visual data showing how confidence in national
governments drops as the goverment faces economic hardship. The first chapter presents the
research question, reviews previous studies, and explores how data on government ideology
may condition the relationship between trust in political institutions and economic hardship.
Drawing on issue ownership-theory,  the thesis  proposes some hypotheses  explaining  why
people  might  turn  to  policy  solutions  of  the  left  or  the  right  when  experiencing  high
unemployment  rates  and  a  stagnating  economic  growth.  According  to  traditional  issue
ownership theory, left-of-centre governments are expected to keep the level unemployment
low, while right-of-centre governments are believed to be superior at stimulating economic
growth  (Hibbs,  1977;  Belager  &  Meguid,  2008:477;   Belke  &  Potrafke,  2012:1127).
However, recent research suggests that social democrats  have become more market-oriented
in their policy solutions, especially in times of economic crisis (Jensen & Mortensen 2014).
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As a consequence, social democrats are believed to increasingly have earned issue ownership
in fiscal matters  vis-à-vis centre-right parties (Jensen & Mortensen 2014). Given that social
democrats  and  conservatives  are  now  both  enjoying  issue  ownership  on  fiscal  issues,
assessing the difference in trust between the two ideologies during economic hardship makes
for  an  interesting  case.  The  analysis  adds  conservative  and  Christian  parties  together,
operationalised as centre-right parties. The terms “conservative” and “centre-right” are used
interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
Chapter two explores the contested concept trust, and discusses how an external shock like an
economic recession relates to trust in political institutions. Further, the chapter presents the
lines of conflicts and current policies of social democratic, centre-right and liberal parties,
before presenting a set of hypotheses. 
Chapter three presents the research design, the data, variables and the sampling procedure of
the dependent variable, followed by a discussion of operationalisation of the variables in the
analysis. After having discussed the variables, I discuss the choice of statistical model and
how the coefficients from the analysis are estimated. The analysis uses matching of data in
order to improve the balance of data, and to reduce model dependence. The empirical analysis
uses a difference in  differences  approach for answering the question on how government
ideology  affects  trust  in  national  governments  during  economic  hardship.
In  chapter  four,  the  results  from the  difference  in  differences-estimations  are  presented,
before turning to a discussion and conclusion of the results in light of the stated hypotheses.
In chapter five, I discuss the validity of the results in light of Adcock & Colliers framework
of measurement validity (2011), before turning to some concluding remarks. 
In the appendices, I perform a series of robustness test, using a range of different matching-
algorithms. This is done to ensure that the findings in the empirical analysis are not driven by
the choice of matching technique.  Overall, the main impression is  that the results are quite
robust.
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Chapter one. Introduction 
1.1 Trust and economic hardship 
In late 2007, an economic recession started growing across several European countries, and
particularly  in  the  Euro  Zone  (Jónsson & Stefánsson 2013:13).   As  a  consequence  of  a
sovereign debt crisis, unemployment started rising, and economic growth stagnated (Jónsson
& Stefánsson 2013:13). By 2010, the unemployment rate had reached its peak across OECD
countries,  hitting  8.3  % (Jónsson & Stefánsson 2013:15).  Yet,  there  were  huge  national
variations in to how the recession influenced the economies of Europe (Jónsson & Stefánsson
2013; Starke, Kaasch & Van Hooren, 2014:225). In Northern Europe, unemployment rates
varied  between  5%  and  10%,  while  many  Southern  European  countries  experienced
unemployment rates well above 10% (Jónsson & Stefánsson 2013:15). Growth did resume in
many countries  by 2010,  but  for  many,  the  recovery was  modest  or  uneven (Jónsson &
Stefánsson 2013:13).  The  unpopular  comeback  of  austerity  policies  derives  from  the
multilayered financial  crisis  inaugurated in 2007- 2008 (Clarke & Newman, 2012:2).  The
severity of the general recession has challenged welfare states, as their financial, social and
political  foundations  were  threatened  by  tightened  government  budgets  and  growing
uncertainty (Jónsson & Stefánsson 2013:15). In Britain, prime minister Cameron presented
the  need for  retrenchment  within  the  rhetoric  of  creating  'Big  Society',  referring  to  civil
society in fulfilling some of the tasks traditionally performed by the welfare state (Jónsson &
Stefánsson, 2013:17).
Figure 1.1. Trust in national governments across Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and
Sweden, 2005-2010. Source: Eurobarometer. 
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Figure  1.1  shows  the  average  annual   level  of  trust  citizens  report  to  have  in  national
governments across  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden
from 2005-2010. From 2005-2007, the ratio of people who report that they do not tend to
trust  their  national government,  decreases.  From 2007 to 2008, we see an increase in the
proportion of people reporting that they tend to trust their political leaders.   From 2009 to
2010, the proportion reporting that  they tend not to trust  their  national  government,  have
grown significantly larger than the proportion who report that they tend to trust their national
governments. 
Previous  studies  examining  the  relationship  between  trust  in  political  institutions  and
macroeconomic variables have found  that uncertainty in political institutions grows as people
are facing difficult times, and this leads to a potential loss of legitimacy in political leaders.
Roth, Nowak-Lehman & Otter (2013) found that the decreasing level trust during staring in
2007 and 2008, were mainly driven by countries belonging to the Euro Zone (EA12), as these
were  hit  the  hardest  by  the  recession.  However,  the  severity  of  the  recession  varied
considerably  across  EU-member  states,  and  Bermeo  &  Bartels  claim  that  “the  Great
Recession  did  not  cause  striking  changes  in  peoples'  political  perceptions  and  behavior”
(2014:8).  Generally,  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the
Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom were  moderately  affected,  while  Spain,  Greece,
Portugal,  Iceland  and  Ireland  were  hit  hardest  by  the  general  recession  in  terms  of
unemployment rates and economic growth (Kriesi, 2014:307; Jónsson & Stefánsson, 2013:14
).
Figure 1.2. Annual percentage growth in Gross Domestic Product and unemployment rates  across Austria, 
Belgian, Denmark, Finland,  Ireland, Italy and Spain and Sweden from 2005-2010. Source: The IMF and  the 
OECD Social expenditure reference series.
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By 2006, figure 1.2  shows a trend towards a weaker economy in terms of GDP growth. 
We see a drastic drop in GDP growth from 2007 until 2009. Between 2009 and 2010, the
GDP  growth  increasingly  recovers,  but  at  the  same  time,  the  unemployment  rate  keeps
growing in the wrong direction.  The graph shows a period of general  economic hardship
lasting  from  2007  until  2010,  measured  as  either  a  worsened  unemployment  rate  or  as
economic growth.  By mid-2008, a GDP recession is evident, and the lowest rate in economic
growth was hit in mid-2009. 
1.2 Political consequences of economic hardship
A context of recession is associated with a reduced scope for policy-choices, and a potential
legitimacy crisis for political leaders, as the state the of economy worsens and unemployment
rises  (Heise  2012:51;   Armingeon  & Ceka,  2013:9).  It  is  unclear  whether  the  recession
actually led governments to generally follow a path of retrenchment, and some scholars claim
that even in spite of austerity, there was still room left for party politics as usual (Jensen &
Mortensen, 2014). A situation of tighter budgets may lead to a shrinking maneuvering-space,
resulting in a situation that especially leads to a change of policies for left-of-centre parties
(Jensen  2010).  A  recession  may  have  led  social  democrats  to  increasingly  embark  on  a
retrenchment-path more similar to conservatives (Jensen 2010). Conservatives one the other
hand, may similarly have changed their stances on economic policies, to become more similar
to  traditional  left-of-centre  parties.  This  thesis  will  study  how  government  ideology
moderates the likelihood of trusting national governments during economic hardship. 
The  research  question  reads  as  follows: How  does  government  ideology  moderate  the
likelihood of trusting national governments during economic hardship? 
1.3 Why is the research question important? 
A central question that pervades the ideology of all parties, is the role of state-involvement in
the  sphere  of  economics.   Parties  left-of-centre,  claim that  the  state  should  have  a  more
regulatory role in politics and economics, while right-of-centre parties believe in less state-
intervention  in  economics,  leaving more  power to  the free  market  (Jensen & Mortensen,
2014). Hobolt et al. found that “voters are less concerned with identifying which part of the
political system is responsible, than with identifying a single political part they can reward or
punish” (2012:165). Studying cabinet parties during times of recession makes an interesting
case, since national governments are likely to be blamed for worsening economic conditions
(Hobolt & Tilley 2014). If the results of the  analysis indicate a definite success of either
Social  democrats  or  Conservatives  during  economic  hardship,  this  points  to  serious
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legitimacy-issues  of  the  parties  that  failed  to  deliver  promising  policy  solutions.  If  the
analysis of the period of recession shows a definite success or failure of a particular ideology,
this  may  also  have  future  implications.  Given  that  the  policies  of  Social  democrats  and
Conservatives receive increased attention in a situation of high uncertainty, people might  use
their  past  experiences  with  their  national  governments  as  a  perceptual  frame  for  future
recessions. Re-establishing trust once it is damaged, can prove a difficult task for parties that
have lost a sense of legitimacy due to an external shock (Easton 1975).
1.4 Economic voting 
‘The citizen votes for the government if the economy is doing all right; otherwise, the vote is
against’ (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000:183). In the literature of economic voting, elections
are  understood  as  a  sanctioning  device,  through  which  people  can  express  their  trust  or
distrust  with  the  current  government.  The  state  of  the  economy   is  theorised  as  being
connected to government support in two ways: through measures of votes, or by popularity
(Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier,  2013:368).  The economic  voting-perspective  claim that  voters
merely assess the performance of the incumbent government, independently of expectations
related to government ideology and issue ownership (Bermeo & Bartels, 2014:186). Lewis-
Beck & Stegmaier (2013) found that unemployment rates, inflation, and economic growth are
closely related to trust  in institutions.  Roth et  al.  found unemployment  to be the primary
determinant of trust in governmental institutions (2011:16). Rohrschneider et al. states that
voters in established democracies “have been socialized to change government when they are
unhappy with the economic performance of a party because they (rightly or wrongly) have
come to believe that this will in due improve the economy under a new set of governing
parties” (2010:18). Clearly,  changes in the economy does affect the popularity of national
governments, but not always in a negative manner. Giger & Nelson (2011), found that liberal
parties actually increase in popularity during economic recession. The findings are explained
by pointing to both parties and voters being diverged in the question of cutting governments'
social spending when facing a recession (Giger & Nelson, 2011). 
15
1.5 Explaining popularity in terms of ideology 
While the link between economic outcomes and votes is widely studied (Key, 1966; Fiorina,
1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Easton, 1965a; Norris, 1999; Sanders, 2000;Veiga & Veiga, 2004;
Kirchgässner, 2009,  Lewis-Beck & Stegamier, 2013:367), the question of how government
ideology may have a moderating effect on political support is less so. The literature has not
yet reached any firm theoretical or empirical conclusions regarding how ideology affects trust
in political institutions. Nannestad & Paldam linked the state of the economy and support for
parties and politicians through elections, known as the vote and popularity functions, or “VP
functions”  (1994:213-245).  The vote and popularity  functions  explain  the support for  the
government as a function of both economic and political outcomes (Nannestad & Paldam,
1994:213-245).  Previous studies have shown some evidence of a link between the state of the
economy and support  for  political  incumbents  (Key,  1966;   Fiorina,  1981;   Lewis-Beck,
1988;   Easton,  1965a;  Norris,  1999;  Sanders,  2000;  Veiga & Veiga,  2004;  Kirchgässner,
2009;  Lewis-Beck & Stegamier,  2013:367) ,  yet  comparative  studies  have found that  the
strength  of  the  relationship  varies  between countries  and time  (Paldam,  1991;  Anderson,
2007). Having emphasized that a worsened economy affects trust,  this thesis explores the
relationship between economic performance and reward and punishment further, by including
government ideology as an explanatory variable. Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier (2013) reviews 16
studies that examine the relationship between economics and voting. One of the implications
from their  review is that political  variables included in studies often measure institutional
clarity,  rather  than government  ideology (Powell  & Whitten,  1993:398;  Hobolt,  Tilley  &
Banducci,  2012;Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier,  2013:376;  Tilley  & Hobolt,  2014).  This  thesis
follows the established literature that links the economy to government support, but rather
than  focusing  on  institutional  factors   in  explaining  the  link  between  the  economy  and
government  popularity,   the  analysis  seeks  to  explore  whether  the  relationship  can  be
explained in terms of political ideology. The new politics perspective claim that partisanship
is declining, vis-à-vis a growing importance of “new politics” (Giger & Nelson, 2011:6). The
“new politics” argument claim that the traditional conflicts placing parties to the left or to the
right,  have  become  less  central,  and  that  issues  such  as  immigration,  environmental
protection, regionalism and nationalism are growing in importance (Giger & Nelson, 2011:6).
This thesis takes an “old-politics”-approach, focusing mainly on economic conflicts between
conservative and social  democratic ideologies,  as organised along the traditional left-right
continuum.   Roth  et  al.  (2011)  studied  the  relationship  between  trust  in  governmental
institutions and the economy from 1999-2012, by controlling for inflation,  GDP per capita,
unemployment and debt per GDP (Roth et al.,  2011:7). The findings are in line with the
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economic  voter-theory,  showing  that  the  state  of  the  national  economy  does  have
consequences  for  the  legitimacy  of  incumbents  (Roth  et  al.  2011).  Rochschneider  et  al,
reaches a similar conclusion,  showing that people vote retrospectively based on economic
performance (2010). 
1.6  Connecting  government  ideology  and  economic  recession:  issue
ownership 
According to the issue ownership theory of voting, “voters identify the most credible party
proponent  of  a  particular  issue  and  cast  their  ballots  for  that  issue  owner”  (Belanger  &
Meguid, 2008:477). Petrocik was the first to use the term issue ownership, which states that
parties enjoy an advantage of competence over their competitors on a specific issue (Petrocik,
1996). This reputation or perception of competence may in turn create a set of expectations
regarding how parties of different ideologies are believed to succeed or fail when attempting
to solve a specific policy-issue (Belanger & Nadeau, 2015:909; Budge & Farlie, 1983; Egan,
2013; Belager & Meguid, 2008). The issue ownership approach  challenges other approaches
to voting behaviour, such as the social cleavages and voter alignment- approach (Belanger &
Nadeau, 2015:909).  In a context of increased dealignment, people are more likely to trust and
to vote for parties they believe have competence on an issue salient  to them, rather than
trusting parties they would traditionally align with (Betz & Meret, 2013:109-111; Oskarson &
Demker,  2013:175;  Oesch,  2008;  Kayser  &  Wlezien,  2010:372;  Van  der  Brug  et  al.,
2007:14).
Stokes (1963) uses the notion "valence issues", explaining a situation in which all parties
agree on a desired policy outcome, but disagree on what measures should be taken to reach a
given goal. Social democrats and conservatives all agree in wanting a “healthy economy”, but
whereas social democrats believe that keeping a low unemployment rate is more effective,
conservatives  tend  to  focus  less  on  social  programmes,  and  are  more  concerned  with
stimulating economic growth than are social democrats (Jensen & Mortensen 2014). As such,
a recession makes for an interesting backdrop for studying trust and government ideology, as
the economy is both a valent issue among parties, and a salient issue among people (Belanger
& Meguid, 2008).  
A recent  contribution  in the literature  on issue ownership finds that  a  given party's  issue
ownership is not always linked to the actual policy performance on that same issue (Egan,
2013:93; Martinsson, 2009:139). From a methodological perspective, disentangling the causal
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direction between trust, issue ownership and actual performance, is challenging: parties may
earn popularity and trust  either by prioritising shaping a reputation on competence,  or by
being successful in their actual policy performance (Belanger & Nadeau, 2015:911). Bermeo
& Bartels claim that “the Great Recession starting in 2008 produced surprisingly little overall
change in the ideological proclivities of voters- and retrospective voting was a stronger and
more consistent factor than ideology in accounting for observed shifts in electoral behavior.
Parties of the left certainly “failed to capitalize” on the crisis in most countries, but voters do
not seem to have been “generally turning to conservative and right-wing political parties,”
either-  except  in  times  and  places  where  a  left-wing  party  presided  over  a  significant
economic  downturn.”  (2014:200).  This  finding has  implications  for  the  manner  in  which
voters  shape  expectations  towards  their  political  leaders.  When  facing  growing
unemployment  rates,  people  might  turn  to  the  political  left.  Conversely,  when  facing
stagnating economic growth, people might turn parties of the political right. In countries that
experienced a combination of growing unemployment and lowered economic growth, it is
unclear whether left-of-centre or right-of-centre parties were most successful in maintaining
popularity and legitimacy (Bermeo & Bartels, 2014:200). 
1.7 Parties and retrenchment 
The economic crisis has shifted focus from being a financial crisis to becoming a fiscal one,
having government debt as its recurrent theme (Clarke & Newman, 2012:2). Governments
imposing unpopular austerity measures may be affecting the political culture in a negative
manner, and as a consequence, trust in political institutions is put to the test. Governments'
policy  responses  to  a  worsening  economy  varied  considerably  across  countries  (Starke,
Kaasch & Van Hooren, 2014:225). Van Hooren et al. (2014) found that drastic policy change
was  more  of  an  exception  than  the  rule  (Van  Hooren  et  al.,  2014:605).   Most  national
governments did not have to impose serious austerity, but the scope for policy maneuvering
did become tighter due to a growing recession and lower budgets (Jensen 2010). Van Hooren
et al., examined social policy responses to four economic shocks in Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Sweden, and found that  incremental  change was far more  common than
radical  policy shifts  (2014).  At  the  same time,  social  spending  is  often  cited  as  a  prime
example of path dependence (Green-Pedersen and Lindblom, 2006; Hacker, 2004; Pierson,
1994).  Measuring  retrenchment  merely  as  cuts  in  social  spending,  government's  fiscal
response is likely to exhibit a pattern of incremental change, while this path dependence is not
as strongly associated with governments fiscal policies during recessions (Green-Pedersen
and Lindblom, 2006; Hacker, 2004; Pierson, 1994).
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Some  political  parties  retrench  more  than  others,  suggesting  that  parties  have  different
incentives  to  cut  social  spending  (Giger  &  Nelson,  2011:13). Electoral  consequences  of
retrenchment  differs  according to  party family (Giger  & Nelson,  2011:13).  Some parties,
rather than avoiding blame, are able to claim credit for cutting social policy spending (Giger
&  Nelson,  2011:13).  Giger  and  Nelson  (2011)  actually  questions  the  assumption  that
retrenchment always leads to loss of popularity among voters (Giger & Nelson, 2011:19).
Specifically, liberal and religious parties were found to systematically win votes from slowing
down social spending (Giger & Nelson, 2011:19).  
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Chapter two. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
2.1 Trust and institutional support 
David Easton (1979) suggests two related concepts, namely affective and utilitarian support,
in  explaining   the  way  in  which  individuals  establish  and  maintain  trust  in  political
institutions. Affective support provides a basic “reservoir of favorable attitudes that enables
members to accept policy-outputs to which they are opposed, or policies that have effects
they perceive as damaging to their wants”(Easton, 1975:444). Policy responses to economic
hardship,  such  as  cuts  in  social  spending,  may  constitute  a  prime  example  of  such  an
unfavorable  policy.  The  Utilitarian,  or  specific  support  has  a  conditioning  effect  on  the
‘reservoir of support’ for a given institution,  and is thus closely related to the concept of
affective  support  (Easton,  1975:444).  Utilitarian  support  is  inherently  unstable,  while
affective  support,  representing  cultural  attachment  and loyalty,  is  a  source  of  stability  in
public support during times of uncertainty (Easton, 1975:444). Affective support therefore
provides the necessary ‘political capital’ to the incumbency to shield them from the fallout of
unpopular  policies  (Easton,  1975:444).  Affective  support  is  less  volatile  than  utilitarian
support, as it is “more difficult  to strengthen, once it is weak,  and to weaken, once it is
strong” (Easton, 1975:444). 
2.2 Conceptualising political trust 
This section explores the concept of political trust. The concept of trust falls into the category
of contested concepts (Gallie, 1955). Zmerli & Hooghe (2001), provides a general definition:
"At  best,  political  trust  is  a  very  thin  form of  trust  and  it  should  rather  be  seen  as  the
expectation  that  political  actors  generally  behave  in  a  fair  manner."  (Zmerli  & Hooghe,
2001:3). The theoretical status of political trust remains dubious, and some authors argue that
it does not make sense to talk about trust at all when analysing peoples' attitudes towards their
political systems (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2001:3).
Zmerli & Hooghe further provide a more specific definition, stating that “political trust means
that the legitimacy of the political regime is acknowledged and that there is a high degree of
willingness  to  accept  the  decisions  of  politicians  and  government  agencies”  (Zmerli  &
Hooghe, 2001:3).  Political  trust  thus presupposes a level of specific  knowledge about the
likelihood  of  trustworthy  behavior  by  someone  else  (Zmerli  &  Hooghe,  2001:3).  This
definition  of  trust,  meaning  “a  general  recognition  of  authority  and  that  democratic
20
procedures will be followed” (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2001:3), is closely related to the concept of
political legitimacy,  and resembles Easton’s definition of affective support, (Easton, 1975;
Zmerli & Hooghe, 2001:3). 
2.3 The function of political trust 
“Since  the  inner  workings  of  government  are  opaque  to  most  and  since  developing
constrained belief  systems is too taxing for many,  political  trust provides people a useful
decision rule” (Converse, 1964). Political trust as a theoretical concept entails that citizens
feel  a sense of trust  in the incumbent  government,  political  institutions  in general,  or the
political community as a whole (Easton, 1965b; Dalton 2004).  When paying costs rather than
receiving benefits, people must trust the government (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015:121)
.This  delegation  of  trust  implies  that  people  believe  that  the  government’s  policies  will
benefit  society,  and  not  misuse  its  mandate  or  waste  resources  (Hetherington  & Husser,
2011:313). Trust in political institutions arranges for allocation of resources, meaning that
both  politicians  and  citizens  depend  on  a  certain  level  of  trust.  Citizens  trusting  their
authorities may allow those authorities to take on new tasks, and trusting them in expanding
or even reducing their scope of action (Hetherington & Husser, 2012:313). Citizens that trust
political institutions believe that political leaders and institutions do have their best interest in
mind, as a form of delegated responsibility, or encapsulated interest. Some authors argue that
low levels of trust may prevent government of assuming a larger role in society,  such as
expansion of social protection and welfare services (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011:2). 
2.4 Economic voting and trust 
Some scholars have defined political trust as “the ratio of people’s evaluation of government
performance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought to perform”
(Hetherington & Husser, 2012:313). This conceptual definition squares well with findings
that suggest changes in trust are most often a function of changes in perceived performance
on salient issues like the economy (Citrin and Green, 1986; Hetherington, 1998; Weatherford,
1984),  although  some  longer-term  factors,  namely  social  trust,  have  contributed  to
fluctuations in political trust as well (Keele, 2007).  From a rational point of view, citizens are
likely to display and express higher levels of political  trust in institutions  that  deliver on
dealing with salient policy-issues, compared to regimes that do not succeed in reaching their
stated policy goals (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2001:3).  Easton’s terminology of trust can contribute
in  explaining  how performance  of  political  institutions  is  likely to  evoke either  affective
(diffuse) or utilitarian (specific) support. Easton hypothesises that people may uphold a strong
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level of trust in political institutions in spite of experiencing hardship, given that they have
developed a sufficient level of affective support: "Even if citizens do not agree with a certain
decision made by the political elite, they are still willing to support the regime in general and
to comply with its decisions" (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2001:3).Drawing on Eastons typology, an
external shock will not automatically result in lowering levels of trust, given that peoples'
affective support is sufficiently established. Lacking specific support from time to time does
to some extent motivate citizens to participate through elections in democratic regimes, while
a  lack  of  diffuse  support,  may  end  the  willingness  to  take  part  in  politics  altogether.
According to Easton (1965b),  we can expect  that utilitarian support fluctuates  to a larger
degree than does diffuse support.
Citizens  trust  in  a  political  system  can  relate  to  different  objects,  and  citizens  may  use
different criteria when evaluation different political institutions (the parliament, the police,
the legal system, politicians). Measuring trust in institutions is challenging, and one can not
simply add these judgments to form a scale of total political trust (Fisher et al., 2010;Zmerli
& Hooghe, 2011:16). Citizens having varying levels of trust in the politicians in office are
often seen as a symptom of a healthy democracy. According to Marien (2011), citizens are
likely to develop one comprehensive attitude of  trust in political institutions, which is shaped
by the political culture of their country. Replacing the politicians in office through elections,
enables  citizens  to  win  back  a  sense  of  specific  support,  having  distrusted  the  former
government. However, the culture within political institutions often originate from a similar
political  environment  (Almond & Verba, 1963). This means that we ought to expect  that
citizen’s evaluations of different institutions are related to one another (Hooghe, 2011). If
citizens are distrusting their political environment as a whole, this has  serious implications
for  affective  support,  and  it  cannot  be  solved  through  simply  replacing  the  incumbent
government, as the national government constitutes only one out of several closely related
political institutions within a country. 
2.5 Studying trust empirically
Having explored some of the aspects of political trust, we now turn to the dependent variable
in the empirical analysis:  Trust in national government.  Drawing on Easton’s typology of
diffuse and specific support (1965a), the Eurobarometer surveys asks respondents to report
whether they "Tend to trust" or "Tend not to trust" their national governments. As Zmerli &
Hooghe notes, the advantage of studying trust in a specific institution is that it is cleared what
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is being measured (2011:15). The drawback is that only one part of the broader concept of
political trust is being measured (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011:15). The trust-variable is measured
biannually, and seems to correspond well with the concept of specific support, as incumbents
are replaced on a regular basis through fair elections in the eight established democracies in
the analysis. 
2.6 Contextualising the hypotheses: government ideology
This section offers a brief presentation of the party-families in the analysis, namely social
democrats,  conservatives  and  Liberals.  Although  the  classification  of  party  families  is
contested, the focus on the long-term development of parties generally justifies considering
the  common  historical  origins  and  cleavages  of  conflict  as  the  defining  criterion  of
membership of a family (Mair & Mudde, 1998: 225).  Building on the state-market placement
of  all  five  parties  in  the  analysis,  this  section  sets  forth  some hypotheses  specifying  the
relationship between the ideologies of the national  governments in the analysis,  and trust
during economic hardship.
Political  ideologies  are  contestable  as  they  are  flexible  and  assembled  in  loose  families
(Freeden 2013:29.30). Political parties combine concepts such as liberty, justice, power and
equality, but order and juxtaposes the concepts differently (Freeden 2013:19). Following von
Beyme (1985:23-24) we include four party families in the analysis: liberals, conservatives,
workers parties and Christian parties. Since conservatives and Christian parties  makes up a
significant amount of Europe's national governments, conservatives and Christian parties are
added together  in  the analysis,  labelled  as  centre-right-  parties.  This operationalisation  of
conservatives  follows  von  Beyme  and  Steed  &  Hearl,  who  identify  Christian  and
conservatives  as  “conservatives”  (von Beyme,  1985:26-59;  Steed  & Hearl,  1985),   while
others  use  the  term  “secular  conservative”,  for  distinguishing  religious  from  secular
conservatives (Gallagher et al., 1995). 
Social spending makes up a significant amount in the overall public expenditures, and this
might represent a burden to national governments (Starke, Kaasch & Van Hooren, 2014:226).
Parties that run a market-oriented fiscal policy are expected to cut in social spending to a
larger extent than more state-oriented parties (Jensen & Mortensen, 2014:2).  Left-of-centre
parties have in some cases been found to retrench more than right-of-centre parties (Green-
Pedersen, 2001). Other studies have found that governments with parties belonging to the
neo-liberal right, have tended to result in greater retrenchment (Allan & Scruggs,  2004:509).
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Jensen  (2010),  argues  that  right-of-centre  governments,  actually  spend  more  on  welfare
programs, compared to left-of-centre governments, in order to compensate for the lack of
trust people in countries with a history of social democracy have in conservative or liberal
parties (Jensen, 2010:289).  Left-of-centre parties are expected to be more in favor of an
expanding welfare state than parties with a market-oriented economic policy (Starke, Kaasch
& Van Hooren,  2014:229).   A situation  demanding fiscal  austerity  represents  a  shock to
equilibrium (Easton 1975). This may lead parties to  shift their preferences towards a more
austerity (Jensen & Mortensen, 2014:144). At the same time, parties located on the right on
the  economic  state-market-axis,  may  have  greater  issue  ownership  in  fiscal  policies,
compared to left-of-centre governments.   Social  Democratic  governments are particularity
interesting in this vein, as they increasingly have gained issue ownership in fiscal policies,
and at the same time, tend to maintain their level of social spending when facing a recession
(Jensen & Mortensen, 2014). Social democratic governments, like most governments, want to
ensure a growing economy, but may at the same time be more concerned with maintaining
the  same  level  of  spending  related  to  social  protection  (Starke,  Kaasch  & Van  Hooren,
2014:229; Jensen & Mortsensen, 2010:2).  This leaves it somewhat unclear what parties will
gain or lose trust as a consequence of facing economic hardship. An economic policy that
involves maintaining the same level of social spending during hardship may increase trust,
but one might hypothesise the same regarding issue ownership in fiscal policies. 
2.7 The Social Democrats 
Social Democratic parties used to be the class parties par excellence. Their origins can be
traced  back to  the  labor/capital  conflict  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  (Knutsen,  2006:54).
Social  Democratic  parties can be found in all  the countries of Western Europe (Lipset &
Rokkan, 1967). Knutsen claims that “the parties that can be expected to be most strongly
anchored  in  social  classes  are  the  parties  based  on  the  cleavages  that  sprang  out  of  the
Industrial  Revolution”,  along  with  Communist,  Social  Democratic,  and  Liberal  parties
(2006:54). Von Beyme notes that the social democratic parties have changed their strategy
and expanded their target group, now being catch-all parties rather than appealing solely to
workers (Von Beyme,  1985: 75).  According to  issue ownership theory,  conservatives  are
facing  a  growing  competition  on  the  competence  on  fiscal  issues  from social  democrats
(Jensen  &  Mortsensen,  2010).  Over  the  past  30  years,  social  democratic  parties  have
increasingly abandoned the interests of their own core constituency to embark on a right-wing
journey of fiscal austerity (Kraft, 2015:1). This change in parties' fiscal policy can partly be
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explained by social democrats trying to signal competence in fiscal matters (Kraft, 2015:1).
Conservative parties are perceived as better able to restrain government spending, compared
to the perception of social  democratic parties (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Petrocik, 1996;
Seeberg, 2014). This asymmetric fiscal reputation makes left-wing governments electorally
vulnerable  to  concerns  about  public  overspending  and  lack  of  fiscal  discipline  (Kraft,
2015:1). Social democratic governments will therefore attempt to improve their reputation
when attention to budget austerity increases (Kraft, 2015:1). They should do so by reducing
spending and budget as extensively as conservative governments (Kraft, 2015:1). This fiscal
compensation  strategy  may  make  conservative  and  social  democratic  fiscal  policy  more
similar during difficult times (Kraft, 2015:1; Starke, Kaasch & Van Hooren, 2014:230).
Figure 2.1.  State-market orientation of conservative and social democratic governments in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy,  Spain and Sweden from 2005 to 2010.  The vertical  axis represents state-
market orientation of parties, with a value equal to zero indicating a total state-orientation, while a value of 10
indicates a total market-orientation in economic policies. Source: ParlGov.
A value equal to zero indicates a total state-orientation in economic policies while a value of
10 indicates a total market-orientation in economic policies. Figure 2.1 Illustrates that Social
democratic  parties  in  government  drastically  changed  their  economic  policies  in  2008,
becoming more market-oriented. However, already in 2009,  their economic policies went
back to normal.  Conservatives did also change their policies in the same direction during
2008, but the change was less profound. Given that social democrats are assumed to have an
increasing issue ownership in fiscal policies, social democratic governments are excepted to
increasingly enjoy legitimacy during GDP recessions, vis-a-vis conservatives. 
Hypotheses  2.7: Social  democrats  are  believed  to  be  moderate  social  spending  during
economic hardship, combined with an increased tendency towards issue ownership in fiscal
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policies. We hypothesise that Social Democratic governments will not be able to uphold their
level  of  trust  during GDP recession to the same extent  as conservatives.  However,  when
assessing the effect of unemployment separately, we expect Social democrats to have a higher
level of trust compared to Conservatives. 
2.8 Centre-right parties – Conservative and Christian democratic parties
Conservative  parties  were among the first  to  develop,  usually as  a defensive  response to
Liberal parties.  We may describe these parties as right-authoritarian in general, which is also
what Kitschel(1994/1995) suggests. Building on insights from issue ownership theory,  the
starting point is that the majority of voters perceive right-leaning parties as better  able to
control  government  spending  and  balance  budgets  than  left-wing  parties  (Bélanger  &
Meguid,  2008;  Petrocik,  1996;  Seeberg,  2014).  In  turn,  this  can  imply  that  when  facing
difficult  times,  people may turn to conservative parties, especially when a GDP recession
occurs separate from times of growing unemployment.  Conservative governments may  be
less likely of causing disappointment when cutting social spending during hardship, because
conservatives  generally  spend  less  on  social  welfare,  compared  to  left-of-centre  parties
(Jensen, 2010). 
Hypotheses 2.8: Centre-right parties enjoys the most established  issue ownership in fiscal
policies,  but are expected  to  cut  in  social  spending. Centre-right  parties are expected  to
increase their level of trust vis-a vis Social Democrats, when assessing the effect of declining
economic growth separately. 
2.9 The Liberals
Liberalism concerns protection of private  property,  human and civil  rights,  pluralism and
regionalism, education policy and social liberalism (von Beyme, 1985: 36-39). We position
the Liberal party family as a right-libertarian party family – right-leaning on the economic
axis, libertarian on the cultural axis. Knutsen (2006:54) identifies the Liberal party family as
the strongest defender of the capitalists in the conflict between labor and capital. In a study of
the relationship between retrenchment and electoral consequences, Giger & Nelson (2011),
found liberal parties to actually gain votes from retrenching social spending (Giger & Nelson,
2011:1).
Hypotheses  2.9:  Liberal  parties  do  not  have  issue  ownership  in  fiscal  policy  or  in
unemployment,  but are expected to gain popularity during economic hardship.  (Giger &
Nelson, 2011).
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Chapter three. Data and methods 
This  chapter  presents  the  data  and  variables,  data  acquisition  and  data  manipulation,
operationalisations  of  variables,  followed by a  discussion of matching and the estimating
technique, difference in differences-estimation. 
3.1 The dependent variable – trust in national governments 
Similarly  to  votes  and  polls,  surveys  assessing  people’s  perceptions  of  their  national
governments, may give and indication of the level of legitimacy of the parties currently in
government (Nannestad & Paldam 1994:223). The thesis uses time series cross sectional data
(TSCS), which consist of comparable time series data  (Beck 2008; Beck & Katz, 2011:332).
The Eurobarometer  surveys  allows us  to study general  political  trust  instead of  votes.  In
addition, we can assess the popularity of governments biannually, as opposed studying mere
votes  at  elections.  The  units  of  the  analysis  are  Eurobarometer  respondents,  national
governments, and macroeconomic variables.Using political trust as our dependent variable,
the Eurobarometer  surveys  allow us to assess the legitimacy of all  parties  in government
across  several  EU-member  states  during  varying  states  of  the  economy.  Additionally  we
include  a  variable  reporting  the  level  of  life  satisfaction  during  economic  hardship. All
standard EB-surveys  from spring 2005 to autumn 2010 are included in the data  set.  The
respondents were asked to tell  whether they tend to trust,  or tend not to trust  a range of
institutions. The alternatives regarding trust in institutions are “Tend to trust”, “Tend not to
trust”, and “Don't know”. The survey question trust in national governments is phrased as
follows:  “I  would  like  to  ask  you  a  question  about  how much  trust  you  have  in  certain
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it  or tend
not to trust it” (the national government). Following Gärtner (1997:448), we obtain  a net
measure of trust by subtracting the number of respondents who report that they “tend to trust”
their governments, from those who report that they “tend not to trust” their governments. The
respondents belonging to the “Don't know” category were excluded from the data.
3.2 Sampling procedure 
This  study  conducts  a  time-series  analysis,  where  the  data  of  interest  includes  repeated
observations  over  time  (Beck,  2001).  The  political  units  in  the  analysis  are  individual
respondents from the Eurobarometer Survey. The regular sample size is 1000 respondents per
country, measured as completed interviews. The years for the Eurobarometer included in the
analysis  spans  from  2005-2010.  The  Eurobarometer  datasets  were  downloaded  from
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gesis.org. A multistage, random probability sampling design is used in the data collection of
all  the  Eurobarometers.  For  each  standard  Eurobarometer  survey,  new  and  independent
samples are drawn. At the first stage of the sampling procedure, primary sampling units are
selected  from each of  the  administrative  regionals  units  in  every  country  (The European
Commission Eurobarometer 70.1:VII ). The selection of observations is systematic, with a
probability proportional to the population size, and from sampling frames stratified by the
degree  of  urbanisation  (The European  Commission  Eurobarometer  70.1:VII).  In  the  next
stage of the data collection, a cluster of starting addresses were randomly selected from each
sampled PSU (The European Commission Eurobarometer 70.1:VII). Further addresses were
chosen systematically using standard random route procedures as every Nth address from the
initial address (The European Commission Eurobarometer 70.1:VII ). Only one interview was
conducted  in  each household,  and the  respondent  was drawn randomly,  according  to  the
closest birthday rule (The European Commission Eurobarometer 70.1:VII ). 
3.3 Missing observations 
The dependent variable, trust in national governments, has a total of 359961 values in the
data.  The aggregated  Eurobarometer-dataset  covering  the  years  2005-2010 had a  missing
percentage of 6,5%, or 23329 values. All respondents reporting “Don't know”, when asked
whether  they  trusted  their  national  governments,  were  excluded  from  the  data.  These
observations were excluded mainly because preprocessing of the data by matching, requires a
binary  dependent  variable.  The  percentage  belonging  to  the  “Don't  know”  category  was
0.0047%, which  amounts  to 1693 values.  Excluding all  the respondents  belonging to  the
“Don’t' know” category, as well as excluding missing values leaves us with a total of 334939
observations of the dependent variable. 
3.4 The co-variates
This section presents the explanatory variables that are matched with the dependent variable,
via preprocessing prior to the empirical analysis. Similarly to the use of control variables in
regression, the aim of matching is to produce a distribution of observations on the dependent
variable that is not systematically affected by the values of the co-variates (Angrist & Pischke
2008:69).  The  variables  covered  in  the  next  subsection,  government  ideology,  economic
growth, unemployment and life satisfaction, are considered likely of affecting levels of trust
in national governments. 
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3.5 Government ideology 
Data  on  government  type  and  government  ideology  derive  from  the  Parliament  and
Government  Composition database.  These are party-families,  start  and end-date  of all  the
governments in the analysis,  as well  as their ideological positions along the left-right and
state-market- continuum.  The end-date of governments was missing in the ParlGov-version
used in the analysis, so the end-date was coded and added to the data. Government ideology
indicates the ideological composition of a given government, concerning the mere name of
the party,  as well as the type of policies pursued, measured along the left-right and state-
market axis derived from the ParlGov dataset.  The ParlGov dataset includes two variables
that indicate party-family identity. The first variable states the name of all parties in the native
language of each country. The second variable states the names of different parties according
to the main party-families of Western-Europe.  In order to be able to generalise about the
effect of ideology on trust in government across countries, the latter variable is utilised in the
analysis. 
3.5.1 The spatial model of ideology 
Pioneered  by the  seminal  work  of  Hibbs  (1977),  traditional  partisan  literature  holds  that
parties conduct policy in accordance with the interests of their core constituency. Historically,
social democratic parties organised to fight for the rights of workers and other low-income
groups,  while  conservative  parties  were  established  to  secure  the  economic  interests  of
business  owners  and  high-income groups.  This  led  the  two groups  of  parties  to  develop
different ideologies concerning social and economic policies.  The ‘politics matters’-view in
the comparative political economy research dates back to the 1970’s (Hewitt 1977; Hibbs,
1977; Tufte, 1978) and has gradually evolved into an extensive literature. As summed up by
Hibbs, the partisan argument “features the idea that parties have electoral ambitions in order
to implement policies favoring their core constituency” (1977:1467). In other words, parties
are policy seeking. The expectation of partisan differences stems from the idea of a long-term
trade-off between unemployment and inflation providing a ‘stable menu of policy choices’
for  governments  (Belager  & Meguid,  2008:477).  The  Left  runs  expansionary  budgets  to
reduce  the  unemployment  risks  of  labor,  while  the  Right  engages  in  fiscal  discipline  to
accommodate the inflationary concerns of capital owners (Hibbs, 1977:1474). Others argue
that  left-wing  governments  are  associated  with  higher  budget  deficits  because  of  their
constituency’s general interest in higher levels of public provision of goods (Blais et al, 1993;
Cowart 1978; Iversen and Wren, 1998).
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A concern when studying the relationship between government ideology and trust, is whether
merely measuring political parties by their names truly captures the relevant aspects of the
concept.  Party names may indicate how a given party is oriented ideologically, but merely
measuring ideology by party- names, leaves out a great deal of information regarding parties'
policy-positions on a range of issues, that may affect peoples' views. Measurement-validity is
of great importance in data quality, because only data of sufficient quality enables researchers
to  make  inferences  and  test  their  hypotheses  (Herrera  &  Kapur,  2007:367).  From  a
philosophical point of view, we can never be sure that we are actually measuring what we
intend to measure (Goertz 2005, Herrera & Kapur, 2007, Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). By
including more specific measures on government ideology might bring us closer to capturing
the range of policy- aspects that are relevant to peoples' perceptions of how their political
leadership response to economic hardship, that shape peoples' evaluations. Party competition
and political discourse often organises itself along an ideological left-right- dimension (Huber
& Ingelhart, 1995:73). The terms “left” and “right” are used to communicate the juxtaposition
of a set of salient issues according to ideology. The left-and right dimension is central in this
respect,  as  parties  and people  use it  as  a  perceptual  frame,  and a  channel  of  a  two-way
communication for organising their political views. By including the more specific left/right
and  state-market-variables,  we  might  get  closer  to  measuring  ideology  than  by  simply
including the names  of  parties.  The two variables  derive from the ParlGov data  set,  and
measure the positions of all parties along a spatial economic (Benoit & Laver 2006, Bakker et
al., 2012) and value-orientated scale (Castle & Mair 1984, Huber & Inglehart 1995, Benoit &
Laver 2006). By including three variables capturing different aspects of the term “ideology”,
we may enhance the measurement validity of our results and inferences. 
3.5.2 Economic orientation- the state-market axis 
According to Downs (1957), party competition concerning the disagreement of the scope of
government intervention in economic issues, takes place along a left-right dimension (Downs
1957,  Huber  &  Ingelhart,  1995:75).  The  0-10  state-market  variable  measures  parties’
orientations on economic policies, (Benoit & Laver 2006, CHESS 2010). We seek to explore
how governments, having a varying set of economic policies, affect trust during economic
hardship. According to the state-market-scale, the Social Democratic parties in the data are
operationalised  as  left-of-centre  parties,  conservatives  and  liberals  are  operationalised  as
right-of-centre- parties. 
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3.6 Macroeconomic variables 
The empirical analysis explores whether levels of political trust during economic hardship
indicates that centre-right and social democrats are now offering  equally promising policy
solutions to recovery,  or whether trust in national governments during times of crisis still
should be explained in terms of traditional issue ownership theory.  The variables measuring
macro-economic conditions derive from the International  Monetary Fund and  the  OECD
Social  expenditure  reference  series. Personal  evaluations  of  recent  national  economic
conditions matter most for economic voting (Belanger & Nadeau, 2015:915).
The  analysis  uses  the  “big  two”  macroeconomic  indicators  as  suggested  by  the  vote  &
popularity-  literature:  the  unemployment  rate  and percentage  GDP growth (Nannestad  &
Paldam  1994:216,  Lewis-Beck  &  Stegmaier  2013:376). Economic  growth,  measured  as
percentage growth in GDP has been considered a “prime driver” in studies of the relationship
between  economic  conditions  and  government  popularity  (Lewis-Beck  &  Stegmaier
2013:376, Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck 2010, Wilkin et al., 1997; Hobolt & Tilley, 2014:3).
Some  scholars  claim  that  the  connection  between  economic  growth  is  linear,  with  and
increase or loss in government popularity according to the state of the economy (Lewis-Beck
&  Stegmaier  2013:376).  Benton  studied  Latin  American  countries  and  found  that  a  1.0
percentage decline in GDP growth will give a popularity loss in the incumbent party vote of
1.7 % (2005:  430).  Wilkin  et  al.  found a similar  effect,  proposing that  every percentage
growth point of GDP gives and increase of 1.4 % in popularity (1997:307).  Research on
unemployment have found a negative relationship between growing levels of unemployment
and confidence in governments (Heise, 2012; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994:215; Roth, Nowak-
Lehmann & Otter, 2011:3; Armingeon & Ceka, 2013:9). 
3.7 Life satisfaction 
Variables such as openness, business climate, post-communism, the number of chambers in
parliament,  Christian  majority  and infant  mortality  rate,  have all  been found to influence
peoples' level of life satisfaction across countries (Bjørnskov et al. 2005:119, Hayo 2004).
Unemployment  is  negatively  associated  with  peoples'  level  of  life  satisfaction  (Helliwell
2003, Bjørnskov 2003, Hayo 2004),  while  national  income is  associated with overall  life
satisfaction (Schyns 1998, Frey & Stutzer 2002). Some studies have found economic growth,
inflation,  economic  freedom,  structure and scope of  government,  as  well  as welfare state
characteristics to be significant determinants of life satisfaction and happiness  (Veenhoven
2000a, Bjørnskov et al. 2007, Bjørnskov et al. 2005:121), while other studies have reported
the same factors to be insignificant (Layard 2006).  It is likely that an economic recession
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affects the level of life satisfaction, such as a  GDP recession or rising unemployment rates.
However, the level of life satisfaction is not expected to change according to government
ideology, only according to economic hardship. The Eurobarometer variable that measures
peoples  level  of general  life  satisfaction,  contains  four options:   “Very satisfied”,  “Fairly
satisfied” , “Not very satisfied” , “Not at all satisfied” and “Don’t know”. In order to be able
to interpret the results on trust and life satisfaction in the same manner, the measuring scale of
the life satisfaction-variable was reversed. Respondents reporting “Very satisfied” were coded
4,  “Fairly satisfied” were coded 3, “Not very satisfied” were coded 2 and “not at all satisfied”
were coded 1. The “don’t know” respondents were excluded.
Hypotheses 3.7: Life satisfaction is expected to decrease when facing high unemployment
rates and when encountering a GDP recession. Life satisfaction is  expected to increase for
liberal parties during GDP recession (Giger & Nelson 2011). 
3.8 Data manipulation 
In all the Eurobarometer surveys, a specific date-variable covering the start and end-date of
fieldwork for data collection as well as a variable indicating the year of all the EB-surveys,
were missing. I have computed a variable indicating the year of the Eurobarometer survey, as
well as a variable indicating the start and end-dates of the fieldwork, using information from
the code books. The fieldwork-variable, with 360 different dates indicating the start-date and
end-date for interviews for the spring and autumn waves by country,  was coded manually
using  information  from  the  code  books  of  each  individual  Eurobarometer  survey.  The
observations from Eurobarometer were merged with observations from the Parliament and
Government Composition database. Only observations that matched between the fieldwork
-periods for the Eurobarometers and the incumbency for parties in the ParlGov data set, were
included in the analysis. This means that only governments that were in office during the time
of  Eurobarometer-fieldwork  were  included  in  the  dataset.  The  Eurobarometer  fieldwork
lasted 30 days on average, but varied between countries. Governments that left office, or that
were replaced during the Eurobarometer-interviews, were excluded. 
3.9 Challenges  in observational research
“We know that our estimates depend on their corresponding modeling assumptions and that
different specifications can yield very different causal inferences”
(Daniel  E.  Ho et  al.  2007:200).  In  all  quantitative  research  that  is  not  experimental,  our
inferences do, to some extend depend on our choice of statistical models. Two ways in which
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this issue can be made less problematic, is by assessing the method of data-collection, as well
as the choice of statistical models from which we make inferences. We define observational
data collection mechanisms as  “any process generating data that does not meet all  three
features of a classical randomized experiment” (Daniel E. Ho et al. 2007:206). The ideal for
data collection when making scientific inferences is a classical randomised experiment. This
ideal  has  contains  three  crucial  criteria:  random  selection  of  respondents  from  a  given
population,  random assignment  of  values  of  the  treatment  to  each  observed  unit,  and  a
sufficiently  large  sample  size.  Most  social  science  laboratory  experiments  have  random
assignment, but miss the random selection-criteria, and often do not meet the criteria of a
sufficiently large number of observations, leading to potential validity issues (Ho, Imai, King
& Stuart, 2007:206).
3.10 Matching
In order to reduce model dependence, we preprocess our data using matching. Randomised
experiments are very rarely conducted in political science, but they still remain important as
an  ideal  type  for  other  research  designs  (Ho,  Imai,  King  &  Stuart,  2007:205).  In  non-
experimental research designs, variables that affect the outcome of the dependent variable,
may be systematically distributed across treatment  groups,  and so confound the treatment
effect (Cochran & Rubin, 1973). Matching can be used when the research design is quasi-
experimental; meaning that random sampling and / or random assignment of the outcome of
the dependent variable is lacking. The aim of matching for preprocessing data, is to reduce
model dependence, and biased inferences (Daniel E. Ho et al. 2007:200). With preprocessed
data,  the treatment  variable  is  closer to being independent  of the background co-variates.
Instead of making the no-omitted variable bias-assumption, and conditioning on the definition
of one key causal variable (y), and a set of control variables (x), matching of data adjusts for
as much of the information in these control variables as possible without making parametric
assumptions.  After  having matched  the  data,  the  potential  for  bias  is  somewhat  reduced,
compared to analysing raw data (Angrist & Pischke 2008:69). However, as with regression,
selection-bias can still exist, due to unobservable variables, as matching and regression are
both strategies attempting to control for bias (Angrist & Pischke 2008:69).
The preprocessing procedures that matching offers, alter the data to make it more similar to
the set up of treatment groups and control groups in an natural experiment (Daniel E. Ho et
al., 2007:205). Genetic matching automates the process of finding a good matching solution
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(Diamond and Sekhon, 2013). Genetic matching automatically finds the set of matches that
minimise the discrepancy between the distribution of potential con-founders in the treated and
control groups (Sekhon, 2011:1).   A concern when working with matched data, is making
sure that our statistical  results are not actually a product of the matching-algorithm itself.
Complete results from the other matching-methods work as robustness-test (see appendix D-
I). Overall, the robustness-tests imply that the results from the analysis will not depend on the
matching technique of choice for preprocessing the data (See appendix C and appendix D-I).
Having matched the data via genetic matching (see appendix D for complete matching-table),
our goal is to be able to compare Eurobarometer respondents across different countries, where
the likelihood of trusting government is only affected by the presence or absence of economic
hardship,  as well  as the ideology of national  governments.  Having matched the data  (see
appendix  C),  all  the  alternative  matching-techniques  (standard-matching,  matching by the
nearest  -neighbor,  optimal  matching  and  subclass  matching  Ho,  Imai,  King  &  Stuart,
2007:206), shows a change of balance identical to the results of genetic matching, except for
the subclass matching.
3.11 Difference in differences estimation
The differences in means,  or difference in differences (DID) estimator is one of the most
popular tools for applied research in economics to evaluate the effects of public interventions
and other treatments of interest on some relevant outcome variables (Abadie, 2005:1). The
conventional  DID  estimator  requires  that,  in  the  absence  of  the  treatment,  the  average
outcomes for the treated and control groups would have followed parallel  paths over time
(Abadie, 2005:1). The difference in differences calculation has the potential to show whether
difficult times affect the probability of trusting national governments, depending on ideology.
In a non-experiment, where the selection of units is not random, direct comparison of the
results may be misleading. This is because the units exposed to the treatment may differ in a
systematical  manner  from the  units  not  exposed  to  the  treatment  (Rosenbaum & Rubin,
1983:42). Matching the dataset can yield a better co-variate balance, meaning  the treatment
and  control  group have  an  equal  distribution  of  the  observed  co-variates  (Rosenbaum &
Rubin, 1983:41), and can be compared by using a difference in differences-estimation. The
difference  in  differences  compares  trust  in  national  governments  with  either  a  Social
democratic or conservative government, both in the absence and the presence of economic
hardship. 
To be able to identify how growing unemployment and stagnating economic growth affects
34
trust in national governments, the analysis applies an approach of difference in difference, or
difference in means, the method requires data available both before and after the treatment.
The treatment in this study is economic hardship. The difference in differences-estimation
requires time series data, capturing observations covering time before and during a treatment
(Angrist & Pischke 2009:227). When comparing the difference in differences, or difference in
means, the level of life satisfaction and trust in centre-right governments is compared to the
level of life satisfaction and trust in social democratic governments, both in the presence and
in the absence of economic hardship. This is measured as governments mean trust and life
satisfaction across all eight countries in the sample from 2005-2010. The second and most
interesting  difference,  is  the  change  in  difference  between  the  ideologies  as  the
Eurobarometer-respondents experience economic hardship (a-c) -  (b-d). When interpreting
the results, the size of change in trust between having a centre-right and social democratic
government  when receiving the treatment  is  of interest,  as this can tell  us how economic
hardship impacts life satisfaction and trust, depending on type of government.   
Before treatment After treatment Change from before to 
after treatment 
Treatment group ȳ T1 ȳ T2 ȳ T1 - ȳ T2
Control group ȳ C1 ȳ C2 ȳ C1 - ȳ C2
  
Difference in differences= (ȳT1-ȳT2  ) - (ȳC1 - ȳC2)
The average  treatment  effect  uses  four  data  points  to  deduce the impact  of  experiencing
economic hardship on the probability of reporting to tend to trust government, depending on
government ideology. This is the effect of the treatment on the treated. The four data points
are the observed average value of trust in government.  We expect that the treatment will have
an effect on the treatment group that breaks the parallel trend between control and treatment
groups (Angrist & Pischke 2009:228). The matched data set was split into four parts. The
control group consists of respondents not experiencing economic hardship, and when there
was a Social democratic government, and one who tended to trust a centre-right government
under the same conditions. The two treatment groups were split according to whether they
tended to trust social democrats or conservatives in two time periods: in the absence and in
the presence of economic hardship, respectively. 
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Dependent variable Government 
ideology
Treatment (Economic 
hardship)
a. Control group Centre-right No 
b. Control group Social democracy No
c. Treatment group Centre right Yes
d. Treatment group Social democracy Yes
Difference in differences=(Social democrat's change in trust)-(Conservatives change in trust)
(a-c)- (b-d)
3.12 Operationalisation of economic hardship and recession 
Some scholars claim that across the EU, welfare and public services have been a main target
for austerity packages (Clarke & Newman, 2012:7; Armingeon & Ceka, 2013; Farnsworth
and Irving 2012). However, the claim that recession lead to austerity and retrenchment, is
contested:  Starke,  Kaasch & Van Hooren (2014) claims  that  there was no uniform fiscal
response to the recession starting in many European countries around 2008 (Starke, Kaasch &
Van Hooren, 2014:225). The analysis aims at explaining how trust varies according to the
state of the national economy,  as well as the ideological composition of government. The
levels of economic growth and unemployment generally does not co-variate systematically
(Kriesi  2014:307).  Kriesi  provides  an  overview  of  economic  indicators  of  the  European
recession starting in 2007(2014:307). According to the index, Ireland, Iceland and Spain were
the three countries most severely hit by the crisis. Having operationalised economic recession
in terms of unemployment rates and GDP growth, the same two countries (Ireland and Spain),
are the countries most severely hit by the crisis in our data. Kriesi correlates GDP growth
with  the  unemployment  rate  in  twenty-nine  European  countries  from 2008  to  2011  and
concludes that they are weakly correlated (Pearson's r=-0.8), (Kriesi 2014:306). Doing the
same with our data from eight European countries,  I find a weak to moderate correlation
between GDP growth and unemployment rates (Pearson's r=- 0.28).This implies that in our
sample of countries,  the level of unemployment  co-varies with economic growth in some
cases. 
As the selection criteria for observations to be included in the data were somewhat strict, we
could not compare all respondents living under the full range of governments from 2005-
2010. As the fieldwork periods for the Eurobarometer surveys lasted about three weeks in
each EU-member states, this sets limits to the number of governments that are included in the
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analysis.  Only  governments  who  were  in  office  during  the  time  of  the  Eurobarometer
fieldwork are included. Subsquently, which Eurobarometer-respondents that are included in
the analysis, depends on the threshold level the analysis set for the  unemployment and GDP
growth rates. 
The  eight  EU-member  states  included  in  the  analysis  were  hit  very  differently  by  the
recession (Jónsson & Stefánsson, 2013:14). In order to study trust in governments during a
recession empirically, we need a working operationalisation of the term economic recession. 
The average level in GDP growth was 0,99 and the average unemployment rate was 7,1 for
the sample of eight countries as a whole from 2005 to 2010. In the first test (table 4.1 ), the
“no crisis”-sample, contains the data from respondents living under conditions of a healthy
economy. A healthy economy is operationalised as having a level of GDP growth above 2 %
and at the same time, having an unemployment rate below 5. In the next sample, where we
measure the effect of economic recession on trust,  I  operationalise  economic recession as
having a GDP growth below -5, and an unemployment rate peaking 12 %. 
In  the  second   test  (table  4.2),  I  run  separates  test  of  unemployment  and  GDP growth,
respectively, to assess whether separate aspects of the economy affects trust in governments
differently.  I operationalised high unemployment  as having an unemployment rate above
average for the entire time period. A GDP recession was operationalised as having a value of
GDP growth equal to zero or negative for the entire time period. 
The aim of the analysis is to compare people living under different political systems, in the
absence and presence of economic recessions. The analysis compares respondents both within
and across countries from 2005-2010.  I used matching in order to achieve a better balance of
the data, so that respondents can be compared both within and across countries. However
matching does not eliminate all possible differences between respondents. Similarly to using
control  variables,  matching  can  only  control  for  the  variables  that  are  included  in  the
matching-process, and so variables left out of the matching can cause selection-bias, similarly
to  omitted  variables  (Angrist  & Pischke 2008:69).  I  did  try  to  make  the  Eurobarometer-
respondents more equal and comparable with respect to the state of the economy, ideological
placement of government and the level of life satisfaction of each respondent, as these factors
may have a moderating effect on the probability of trusting ones government.
We seek to explore whether people are more likely to put their faith in a Social democratic or
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conservative  government  during  difficult  times.  The  moderating  effect  of  government
ideology is assessed in two samples: First, in a context where we compare political systems
severely hit by the economic downturn (Ireland 2008-2009 and Spain 2008-2009, to systems
not  severely hit  (Austria  2006-2007,  Denmark 2005,  Ireland 2005-2006).   Following our
sampling-criteria, observations are selected based on existing observations for trust in EU-
member states. In the next sample, we assess the sample as a whole, testing the effects of
unemployment  and  GDP-recession  separately  in  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden (2005-2010).  The empirical analysis was done by splitting
the  data  of  the  dependent  variable  into  two groups:  Respondents  who reported  that  they
tended to trust their national government, and respondents who reported that they tended not
to  trust  their  national  governments.  The  difference  in  difference,  or  difference  in  means
analysis  compares  the  two  groups  according  to  incumbency  ideology  under  two  sets  of
economic  conditions:  One  in  which  the  respondents  experience  a  high  level  of
unemployment, and one in which the rate of GDP growth reaches a recession. The research
design  allows  us  to  explore  the  moderating  effect  government  ideology  have  on
Eurobarometer respondents who do not experience economic hardship. Economic hardship
makes up the treatment variable, and as in natural experiments, the difference in difference
design compares the level of change of the dependent variable (trust in national governments)
as  a  consequence  of  receiving  the  treatment  (experiencing  economic  hardship).  The
coefficients  from the DID- analysis represent the change of mean trust in centre-right and
Social democratic governments, when comparing the change of the mean level of trust in the
absence of the treatment, to the mean level of trust when receiving the treatment.  This design
makes  it  possible  to  measure  how  much  legitimacy  centre-right  or  Social  democratic
governments lose or gain as a consequence of economic hardship, relative to each other. The
coefficients represent the relative changes in trust. Trust is a binary variable, measured on a
scale  from  0  to  1,  where  1  means  that  the  respondents  “tend  to  trust”  their  national
governments, and 0 implies respondents who “tend not to trust” their national governments.
The level of life satisfaction is measured on a scale running from 1-4, where 4 is equal to
respondents stating they are “Very satisfied” with their lives, a value equal to 3 means that the
respondents are “Fairly satisfied”, while a value of 2 means “Not very satisfied”. A value of 1
is equal to respondents reporting being “Not at all satisfied”. 
38
Chapter four. The empirical analysis
The initial sample (no crisis, table 4.1) compares Eurobarometer respondents during either a
center-right or a social democratic national government during a deep economic recession
(crisis, table 4.1). In table 4.1, the first column measures peoples level of trust, while living
under healthy economic conditions,  measures  as having a GDP growth rate  above 2, and
having unemployment rates below 5. The countries that fit this definition of the economic
state,  were Austria  in  2006 and 2007,  Denmark  in  2005,  and Ireland in  2005 and 2006.
Austria  had a  social  democratic  government  in  2007,  and apart  from that,  the remaining
governments in the sample were centre-right. The next sample (Crisis, table 4.1), seeks to
explain how peoples likelihood of trusting governments of different ideologies changes in the
presence of an economic recession. In this test, the unemployment rates had to peak 12 %,
while the economic growth rate was set to -5 or lower. Respondents from Ireland in 2009 and
2010 and Spain from 2009 an 2010 were the only countries in the sample that faced such a
serious  recession.  Ireland  still  had  a  centre-right  government,  while  Spain  had  a  social
democratic government.
The next test (table 4.2), we include the entire sample, assessing the effects of two treatments:
high unemployment and GDP recession.  For the sample of eight countries as a whole, the
mean level of annual GDP growth was 0,99%, while the annual mean unemployment rate was
7,1 %.  Trust in national governments and life satisfaction is assessed across all eight EU-
member  states  in  the  data:  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,Ireland,  Italy,  Spain  and
Sweden from 2005 to 2010. The aim of this test is to uncover some general trends on how
macroeconomic  conditions  shape  confidence  in  political  institutions.  I  operationalised  the
first treatment, high unemployment  as having an unemployment rate above average for the
entire time period. The second treatment,  GDP recession, was operationalised as having a
value of GDP growth equal to zero or negative for the entire time period. 
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Table 4.1 Trust and life satisfaction for respondents living under conditions of economic
crisis
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
t-value
No treatment 0.510
(0.499)
0.605
(0.489)
-0.094* -7.6926
Crisis 0.196
(0.397)
0.287
(0.452)
-0.039* -8.0045
Life satisfaction
No treatment 3.312
(0.659)
3.046
(0.593)
0.266* 790.25
Crisis 3.207
(0.714)
2.837
(0.715)
-0.103* 785.27
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=11030 
Figure  4.1. Trust  and  life  satisfaction  for  respondents  living  under  conditions  of  economic  crisis.  Source:
Eurobarometer, ParlGov, the IMF and the OECD Social expenditure reference series.
Table 4.1 and figure 4.1 Shows the coefficients for trust and life satisfaction during social
democratic and centre-right governments in the absence of, and during a crisis. In the absence
of  experiencing  a  crisis  (no  treatment),  with  GPD  growth  rates  above  2%,  and  an
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unemployment rate equal to less than 5 %,  social democratic governments enjoyed 9,4 %
more  trust  than  did  centre-right  governments.  As  the  respondents  received  the  treatment,
measured as having an unemployment rate above 12, and a GDP growth rate below -5, social
democrats  still  enjoy  a  higher  level  of  trust,  although  the  treatment  was  associated  with
decreasing levels of trust for both government types.  As a consequence of experiencing a
recession, the probability of trusting a centre-right party dropped from 0,510 to 0,196, while
social  democrats  experienced  a  drop  from 0,605  to  0,287.  The  difference  in  differences
between social democratic and centre-right governments were 3,9 %, with social democrats
enjoying a higher level of trust.  This means that going from a situation of a healthy economy
to experiencing a crisis, social  democrats lose less trust than do centre-right governments.
Turning  to  life  satisfaction,  an  economic  crisis  was  associated  with  a  decrease  in  life
satisfaction  under  both  types  of  governments.  Initially,  centre-right  governments  were
associated with respondents reporting a higher level of life satisfaction compared to social
democrats: in the absence of a treatment, respondents under a centre-right government had a
level of life satisfaction equal to 3,3, while the level of life satisfaction was equal to 3 under
social democratic governments.  A value of 3 means that the Eurobarometer respondents felt
“Fairly  satisfied”  with  their  lives  in  general.  As  with  trust,  the  level  of  life  satisfaction
dropped  when  receiving  the  treatment,  but  contrary  to  the  results  on  trust,  the  loss  of
legitimacy was greater for social democrats. The difference in differences were 10,3%, with
respondents  living  under  centre-right  governments  having  the  highest  level  of  life
satisfaction, with 3,2  and a level of life satisfaction equal to 2,8 for social democrats. This
implies  that  social  democrats  were  associated  with  a  greater  drop  in  the  level  of  life
satisfaction as a consequence of experiencing a crisis, compared to centre-right governments. 
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Table 4.2 Trust and life satisfaction in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden.
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
t-value
No treatment 0.526
(0.499)
0.494
(0.500)
0.032* 4.315
High 
unemployment 0.400
(0.489)
0.466
(0.498)
0.097* 12.982
GDP recession
 
0.453
(0.498)
0.323
(0.468)
-0.098* -16.708
Life satisfaction
No treatment 3.331
(0.654)
3.049
(0.649)
0.281 1326.6
High 
unemployment 3.270
(0.655)
3.149
(0.660)
0.160 750.1
GDP recession 3.359
(0.649)
2.982
(0.714)
-0.094 1400.6
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=101205.
Figure 4.2. Trust and life satisfaction in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden.
Source: Eurobarometer, ParlGov, the IMF and the OECD Social expenditure reference series.
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Table 4.2 shows how rising unemployment and declining GDP growth affects trust and life
satisfaction across Austria,  Belgium, Denmark,  Finland, Ireland, Italy,  Spain and Sweden.
The results indicate that experiencing rising unemployment and a GDP recession, decreases
the  probability  of  trusting  both  centre-right  parties  and  social  democrats  in  national
governments. As a consequence of experiencing high unemployment, social democrats were
associated with a level of trust 9,7 % higher than centre-right parties. Similarly, the results
support the claim that centre-right governments maintain issue ownership in fiscal matters. In
the full sample, centre-right governments were associated with a level of trust 9,8 % higher
than social democrats as a consequence of experiencing a GDP recession. Turning to how the
treatments affected the level of life satisfaction, centre-right  governments were associated
with a higher level of life satisfaction through high unemployment and through times of GDP
recession.  As respondents received the first  treatment,  high unemployment,  the difference
between life satisfaction under centre-right and social democratic government was 16 %, with
centre-right governments associated with the highest level of life satisfaction. During a GDP
recession,  the  difference  in  differences  was  9,4  %,  with  centre-right  governments  being
associated with the highest level of life satisfaction. Interestingly, and contrary to the results
on trust, the level of life satisfaction increased slightly for respondents living under centre-
right governments during GDP recession. 
4.3 Summary of results 
Building on Easton's typology of support in institutions, a more unstable economy generally
seems  to  be  associated  with  growing  uncertainty  that  centre-right  and  social  democratic
political leaders are able to make the right decisions, while having the interest of the voters in
mind. However liberal parties increased in popularity under conditions of GDP recessions
(see appendix H).  The results from the difference in difference-estimation also shows that
unemployment has a different impact on trust than do GDP growth; People generally seem to
trust incumbent politicians of the centre-right when facing a GDP recession, but seem to turn
to Social democratic governments as unemployment rises. 
Hypothesis 2.7 stated that social democratic governments would maintain their level of trust
compared to centre-right governments during times of high unemployment, while not being
able to compete with the centre-right during times of GDP recessions. 
The results from both tests (yable 4.1 and 4.2) shows that both centre-right parties and social
democrats  lose  a  significant  level  of  trust  when  facing  a  recession.  However,   social
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democrats seemed more competent at maintaining their level of trust vis-à-vis centre-right
governments in the initial  sample (table 4.1). Here,  the difference in differences between
social democratic and centre-right governments were 3,9 %, with social democrats enjoying a
higher level of trust during a general economic hardship.  However, these results are based on
data  from  Austria  in  2006  and  2007,  Denmark  in  2005,  and  Ireland  in  2005  and  2006
(absence of economic crisis), as well as Ireland and Spain 2009-2010 (treatment). We need to
question the potential for generalization of the findings shown in the initial test, concerning
the size of the sample.  Concerning high unemployment,  social  democrats did also have a
slightly higher level of trust, as they gained an increase of 5% trust when facing a recession,
compared to liberal parties  (see appendix H).  
Hypotheses 2.8 Stated that  centre-right parties are expected to increase their level of trust
vis-a  vis  Social  Democrats,  when  assessing  the  effect  of  declining  economic  growth
separately. The data did support the stated hypotheses, as center-right governments did enjoy
a higher level of trust compared to social democrats, when assessing the effect of a GDP-
recession separately (Table 4.2).  
Hypotheses 2.9 stated that liberal parties do not have issue ownership in fiscal policy or in
unemployment, but are expected to gain popularity during economic hardship. The results
cannot say whether liberal parties actually did retrench or not, but liberal governments did
have a higher level of trust compared to social democrats during a GDP-recession. During a
GDP recession, liberals had a level of trust  higher than social democrats, as they gained 20%
in popularity when facing a recession (see appendix H).  
Hypotheses  3.7  stated  that  life  satisfaction  was  expected  to  decrease  when  facing  high
unemployment rates and when encountering a GDP recession, and that life satisfaction is
expected to increase for liberal parties during GDP recession. In the first test of results (table
4.1), the results show that an economic crisis was associated with a declining level of life
satisfaction under both centre-right and social democratic governments. 
In the next test (table 4.2), life satisfaction decreased for respondents living under a center-
right government during high unemployment,  while the opposite was true for respondents
living under a social democratic government. During a GDP recession, life satisfaction for
people  under  a  centre-right  government  increased,  while  the  opposite  was  true  for
respondents living under a social democratic government (table 4.2).
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The results  of  the  empirical  analysis  indicates  that  the  way in  which  economic  hardship
challenges  the  legitimacy  of  national  governments,  and  how  it  affects  peoples  life
satisfaction, varies  according to party family, as well as to the issue ownership of parties.  In
generating  our  hypotheses,  we  assumed  that  people  will  punish  political  leaders  as  a
consequence of growing uncertainty in the economy. This assumption did hold, except for
liberal  parties,  who  increased  their  popularity  when  facing  economic  hardship.  Previous
literature suggests that  the constituency of liberal  parties  actually  support social  spending
when facing recession, as suggested by Giger and Nelson (2011). An implication of this result
and as suggested by Giger and Nelson (2011), future studies should consider the theoretical
possibility  that  fully  informed  citizens  do  not  punish  political  leaders  during  economic
hardship.  We  hypothesised  that  Conservative  parties  enjoys  the  most  established   issue
ownership in fiscal policies, and were expected to increase their level of trust vis-à-vis Social
democrats when assessing the effect of economic growth separately. The empirical analysis
have  shown a  general  trend,  showing Conservative  governments  enjoying  a  significantly
higher level of trust during GDP recessions, compared to Social democrats. The empirical
analyses have shown that the relationship between trust and economic recession is nuanced;
The popularity of and the demand for the policies of different political ideologies depend on
the type of economic hardship people are experiencing. While growing unemployment seems
to raise the demand for parties with state-oriented economic policies, a GDP recession seems
to increase the legitimacy for market-orientation solutions.  Contrary to Bermeo & Bartels
(2014:8),  who claim that “the Great  Recession did not cause striking changes in peoples'
political perceptions and behavior”, we did find that the Great Recession was associated with
changes in peoples' political perceptions, measured as confidence in key political institutions.
Encountering  economic  hardship was associated  with a  decreasing level  of confidence  in
national governments, and growing unemployment and GDP recessions had separate impacts
on trust, depending on government ideology. 
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Chapter five. Limitations and conclusion 
5.1 Limitations
Adcock and Collier  (2001) contend that  the process of  moving from ideas  to observable
indicators works through four steps. First, there is the background concept which usually take
on a variety of meanings, in this case the concept of trust. Then, after having reflected upon
the background concept,  one move towards to the  systematized concept  which involves a
more  explicit  definition  applied  by a  scholar.  The third level  is  where the  indicators  are
developed in order to operationalise the systematised concept in a sufficient manner. Finally,
the fourth level are the observable scores. This section evaluates the validity of the results in
light of Adcock & Colliers three aspects of validity: content validity, criterion validity and
construct validity (2001:537). 
Taking the contested concept trust as our starting point and background concept, chapter two
discussed  the  concept,  and  emphasized  that  trust  is  highly  dependent  on  context.   As
mentioned in chapter two, trust contains many aspects. Citizens may use different criteria
when evaluation different political institutions (the parliament, the police, the legal system,
politicians). Measuring trust in institutions is complicated, and one can not simply add these
judgments in different institutions together to form a scale of total political trust (Fisher et al.,
2010;Zmerli  & Hooghe,  2011:16).  This  means  that   when studying a  vague or  contested
concept,  one must  apply it  to  a specific  object.  As Zmerli  & Hooghe (2011) notes,  “the
advantage  of  studying  trust  in  a  specific  institution  is  that  it  is  cleared  what  is  being
measured , while the drawback is that only one part of the broader concept of political trust is
being measured” (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011:15).  We operationalised  trust as trust in national
governments, based on the established literature on government performance and popularity
(Key,  1966; Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988;  Easton, 1965a; Norris, 1999; Sanders, 2000;
Veiga  &  Veiga,  2004;   Kirchgässner,  2009).   Relating  to  measurement  validity,  this  is
certainly a point that needs to be stressed: The Eurobarometers offers a range of variables
reporting peoples' trust in political institutions that may be more relevant, and that capture a
broader range of the background concept, such as political parties in general, the national
parliament,  the European Union, the European Parliament,  the European Commission,  the
Council of the EU or the European Central Bank. 
As Adcock & Collier  notes,  “a valid measurement  is  achieved when scores meaningfully
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capture ideas in the corresponding concept” 2001:530). We cannot be sure that choosing trust
in national governments offers the most promising measure of political trust during economic
hardship:  consequently,  the  content  validity  of  our  results,  meaning  “how  well  a  given
indicator adequate capture the full content of the systematized concept” (Adcock & Collier,
2001: 538), is limited. As matching requires a binary dependent variable (Ho, Imai, King &
Stuart, 2007), I  excluded the Eurobarometer-respondents reporting “Don't know” when asked
whether they tended to trust their national governments. By excluding people that are not sure
of if they have trust in government or not, the results might be biased, as it contains a much
larger  proportion  of  people  having  strong  opinions,  leaving  out  respondents  that  are
uninformed or do not care about their feelings and opinions towards their government. This
could potentially be a source of threat to the content validity of the results.  As mentioned
earlier, trust in highly dependent on context (Easton, 1975). As we have studied respondents
across eight EU-member states, considering including a measure of trust in EU-institutions
may capture more relevant aspects that relates to trust in institutions during the recession
starting in 2007. Other studies have stressed that both political institutions at the national and
the European level, affect trust during the recession in Europe (Hooghe & Marks 2005; Roth,
Nowak-Lehman & Otter 2011; Roth 2009/2011; Tilley & Hobolt, 2014). Consequently, when
choosing to  measure  trust  as  trust  in  national  institutions,  this  is  a  trade-off,  as  we only
measure one aspect of a broader background concept (Adcock & Collier 2011). In the same
vein, further studies should more carefully examine whether national or EU-institutions are
more relevant when studying peoples' trust during the recession starting in 2007.  Although
our  results  indicate  that  government  ideology  affects  trust  during  economic  hardship,
moderated  by party ideology,  future studies may benefit from using a more comprehensive
framework for operationalising ideology. This thesis utilised the three established measures
when operationalising  party ideology:  family name,  placements  along the  left-right  value
axis,  and  placements  along  the  state-market  axis.  This  operationalisation  may  be  overly
simplistic, as important aspects of government ideology that affects trust, may have been left
out. This is a threat to the content validity of our inferences. 
Secondly, our criterion validity, which “assesses whether the scores produced by an indicator
are empirically associated with scores for other variables” (Adcock & Collier, 2001: 537), is
low, as the concept political trust  has different meanings, depending both on context, and on
which political  object  or institution  it  is  being empirically  juxtaposed with (Fisher et  al.,
2010;Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011:16). 
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Lastly,  we turn  to  construct  validity.  According  to  Adcock  & Collier,  construct  validity
means “whether a given indicator is empirically associated with other indicators in a a way
that  conforms  to  theoretical  expectations  about  their  interrelationship”  (2001:  537)  .  I
interpret the findings from the empirical analysis as only lending more support to previous
research between the state of the economy and incumbent popularity (Nannestad & Paldam,
1994; Roth et al. 2011, Roth, Nowak-Lehman & Otter, 2013; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013,
Giger and Nelson, 2011). Turning to issue ownership, we stated that it seemed somewhat
unclear whether left-of-centre or right-of-centre parties were most successful in maintaining
popularity and legitimacy during the recession (Bermeo & Bartels, 2014:200). In the initial
test  (table  4.1),  social  democrats  were  most  successful  in  maintaining  legitimacy  as  a
consequence  of  hardship.  However,  as  the  data  in  the  initial  test  only  covered  certain
countries through a relatively short time span, the potential for generalisation of these results
needs to be critically considered.  The results  from the full-sample assessment  (table 4.2),
squares well with previous studies and theoretical expectations on government ideology and
issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996; Belanger & Meguid, 2008:477; Jensen & Mortensen 2014;
Kayser & Wlezien, 2010:372; Van der Brug et al., 2007:14). 
The European recession starting in 2007, had characteristics differing it from other recessions
occurring in other contexts (Jónsson & Stefánsson 2013; Bermeo & Bartels  2014). As an
implication, we cannot assume that our results can be generalised to other future recessions in
the same sample as we have studied, or even in other political systems overlapping with the
time period of this study. Moving our hypotheses to other context, such as former communist-
countries, we might expect different results, as trust in political institutions is largely affected
by the context in which one studies the phenomenon (Easton 1975). In fact, some authors
claim that in some context, it does not make sense to apply the concept “political trust”, while
in established democracies, as we have studied here, political trust has a meaning, although it
still  remains a contested concept (Zmerli & Hooghe 2001:3). Characteristics related to the
political systems in our sample, as well as characteristics of this particular crisis, points to a
low potential for  assuming external validity. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
A central task in this thesis has been to assess whether government ideology moderates the
effect between the economy and incumbency popularity.  As stated in the introduction, the
link between the economy and support for political leaders is well established (Key,  1966;
Fiorina,  1981;  Lewis-Beck,  1988;  Easton,  1965a;  Norris,  1999;  Sanders,  2000;  Veiga  &
Veiga, 2004; Kirchgässner, 2009). However, most studies that have explored the relationship
between support for governments and political variables, have mainly focused on institutional
features  and  clarity  of  responsibility  (Powell  &  Whitten,  1993:398;  Hobolt,  Tilley  &
Banducci,  2012;Lewis-Beck  &  Stegmaier,  2013:376;  Tilley  &  Hobolt,  2014).  The
contribution of this thesis is its sole focus on whether government ideology has a moderating
effect  on  trust,  when  assessing  the  relationship  between  the  economy  and  incumbency
popularity. The analysis estimated the mean differences in trust in centre-right governments
versus social democratic governments in the absence and presence of economic hardship. 
The empirical  analysis  has shown that trust in national  governments  generally drops as a
consequence of a recession. However,  trust and life satisfaction do not systematically follow
the same paths as people experience economic hardship. The results did not find sufficient
support for assuming that trust and life satisfaction are intertwined as concepts in a context of
economic crises. Despite the claim that Social democrats have become more market-oriented
in their economic policies (Jensen 2010), the analysis couldn't find any support of the claim
that  Social  democrats  have earned issue ownership in fiscal matters.  For the sample as a
whole, we found support for the claim that conservatives still have superior issue ownership
on fiscal matters, while the opposite is true for social democrats during high unemployment.
This gives support to the established literature on issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996; Belanger
& Nadeau, 2015:909; Budge & Farlie, 1983; Egan, 2013, Belager & Meguid, 2008, Bermeo
& Bartels 2014:186). However, knowing that the relationship between crises and confidence
in  political  institutions  are  heavily  influenced  by  context,   we  cannot  assume  the  same
patterns of trust and life satisfaction for crises occurring in different context,  or for crisis
emerging for other reasons than a financial  or economic.
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Appendix A
Survey questions from Eurobarometer: trust in national governments and life 
satisfaction
Trust in national governments 
I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions.
For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust 
it.
Q.A12_9 The (NATIONALITY) Government
1 Tend to trust
2 Tend not to trust
3 DK
9 Inap. CY-TCC (coded 33 in V6)
Life satisfaction
Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with each of the following things?
(SHOW CARD WITH SCALE)
(READ OUT)
Q.46_1 With the life you lead
0 No answer (NO only)
1 Very satisfied
2 Fairly satisfied
3 Not very satisfied
4 Not at all satisfied
5 DK
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Appendix B
List of all parties included in the analysis 
Country Party name Party name (English) Party family
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei Austrian peoples' Party Christian 
democracy
Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Österreichs
Social Democratic Party of Austria Social 
democracy 
Belgium Partij voor Vrijheid en 
Vooruitgang
Party of Liberty and Progress Liberal 
Parti Socialiste Francophone Socialist Party Social 
democracy 
Mouvement Réformateur Reformist movement Liberal 
Parti Social Chrétien Francophone Christian Social PartyChristian 
democracy 
Parti Socialiste Francophone Socialist Party Social 
democracy 
Christen-Democratisch en 
Vlaams
Christian Democrats & Flemish Christian 
democracy 
Denmark Venstre Liberal party of Denmark Liberal 
Konservative Conservatives Conservative
Finland Suomen 
Sosialidemokraattinen/ 
Finlands Socialdemokratiska 
Parti
Social Democratic party of Finland Social 
democracy 
Kansallinen 
Kokoomus/Samlingspartiet
National Coalition Party Conservative
Ireland Fianna Fail Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny) Conservative
Italy Partito Repubblicano Italiano Republican Party Liberal 
Spain Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español
Spanish Socialist Workers Party Social 
democracy
Sweden Socialdemokraterna Social democrats Social 
democracy
Folkpartiet Liberals Liberal
Moderaterna Moderate Party Conservative
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Appendix C
Percentage balance improvement after matching the data by genetic matching 
Variable 
Genetic 
matching
Standard 
matching
Nearest- 
neighbor 
matching
Optimal 
matching 
Subclass 
matching
Christian 
Democracy -17. 6968 -17. 6968 -17. 6968 -17. 6968 53.1823
Conservative  77. 4184  77. 4184  77. 4184  77. 4184 32.4896 
Liberal 52. 2806 52. 2806 52. 2806 52. 2806 79.0844
Social
Democracy 86. 2571 86. 2571 86. 2571 86. 2571
-
381.8272
Left-right  64. 2280  64. 2280  64. 2280  64. 2280 77.9423
State-market -9. 7779 -9. 7779 -9. 7779 -9. 7779 70.5829
Unemployment  32. 0622  32. 0622  32. 0622  32. 0622 84.9414 
GDP growth  32. 0622  32. 0622  32. 0622  32. 0622 94.9116
Life satisfaction  27. 4929  27. 4929  27. 4929  27. 4929 81.8527 
How does matching affect the balance of the co-variates? 
Most of the variables does benefit somewhat from matching. Looking at the first column, the 
balance of the main parties at interest, do not all benefit from matching. The balance of 
Christian democratic parties in government worsens by almost 18 %. The balance of 
Conservative parties improves by 77 %, while the balance of Liberals and Social democrats 
improves by 52 and 86 %, respectively. The left-right variable measuring government 
ideology improves by 64 %, while the state-market variable, measuring economic policies, 
worsens by almost ten percent. The macro-economic variables, unemployment and GDP 
growth both improves by 32 %. The variable measuring the Eurobarometer respondents level 
of life satisfaction improves by 27 %. Overall, the matching of data causes little overall 
changes in the balance of variables. The next four columns in the table above represents 
robustness-test of our results, having balanced the data  via alternative matching- algorithms: 
standard-matching, matching by the nearest -neighbour, optimal matching and subclass 
matching (Ho, Imai, King & Stuart, 2007:206). All the alternative matching-techniques shows
a change of balance identical to the chosen matching technique, genetic matching, except for 
the subclass-matching. Overall, this implies that the results from the analysis will not depend 
on the matching technique of choice for preprocessing the data.
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Appendix D
Complete table of balance improvement after standard matching 
Percent balance 
improvement Mean difference eQQ median eQQ mean eQQ max
Distance 23.0922 14.4681 23.0955 18.9362
Christian Democracy -17.6968 0.0000 -17.7215 0.0000
Conservative 77.4184 0.0000 77.4167 0.0000
Liberal 52.2806 0.0000 52.3066 0.0000
Social democracy 86.2571 0.0000 86.2500 0.0000
Left-right 64.2280 0.0000 64.2689 0.0000
State-market -9.7779 0.0000 -9.7769 0.0000
Unemployment 32.0622 34.3747 32.0568 0.0000
GDP growth 27.3099 45.0980 24.9587 0.0000
Life satisfaction 27.4929 0.0000 27.4934 0.0000
Results from analysis on data after standard matching 
The impact of political ideology and crisis on trust and life satisfaction
Table 5.1a: Trust and life satisfaction for respondents living under conditions of economic crisis
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
p-value t-value
No crisis 0.510
(0.499)
0.605
(0.489)
-0.094* 2.094e-14 -7.6926
Crisis 0.196
(0.397)
0.287
(0.452)
-0.039* 1.455e-15 -8.0045
Life satisfaction
No crisis 3.312
(0.659)
3.046
(0.593)
0.266*
2.2e-16 
790.25
Crisis
3.207
(0.714)
2.837
(0.715)
-0.103*
2.2e-16 785.27
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=11030.  
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Table 5.1b: Trust and life satisfaction in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and
Sweden
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
p-value t-value
No treatment 0.526
(0.499)
0.494
(0.500)
0.032* 1.616e-05 4.315
High 
unemployment 0.400
(0.489)
0.466
(0.498)
0.097* 2.2e-16 12.982
GDP recession
 
0.453
(0.498)
0.323
(0.468)
-0.098* 2.2e-16 -16.708
Life satisfaction
No treatment 3.331
(0.654)
3.049
(0.649)
0.281 2.2e-16 1326.6
High 
unemployment
3.270
(0.655)
3.149
(0.660) 0.160 2.2e-16 750.1
GDP recession 
3.359
(0.649)
2.982
(0.714)
-0.094 2.2e-16 1400.6
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=101205.
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Appendix E
Complete table of balance improvement after nearest-neighbor matching 
Percent balance 
improvement Mean difference eQQ median eQQ mean eQQ max
Distance 23.0922 14.4681 23.0955 18.9362
Christian Democracy -17.6968 0.0000 -17.7215 0.0000
Conservative 77.4184 0.0000 77.4167 0.0000
Liberal 52.2806 0.0000 52.3066 0.0000
Social democracy 86.2571 0.0000 86.2500 0.0000
Left-right 64.2280 0.0000 64.2689 0.0000
State-market -9.7779 0.0000 -9.7769 0.0000
Unemployment 32.0622 34.3747 32.0568 0.0000
GDP growth 27.3099 45.0980 24.9587 0.0000
Life satisfaction 27.4929 0.0000 27.4934 0.0000
Results from analysis on data after nearest-neighbor matching 
The impact of political ideology and crisis on trust and life satisfaction
Table 5.2a: Trust and life satisfaction for respondents living under conditions of economic crisis
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
p-value t-value
No crisis 0.510
(0.499)
0.605
(0.489)
-0.094* 2.094e-14 -7.6926
Crisis 0.196
(0.397)
0.287
(0.452)
-0.039* 1.455e-15 -8.0045
Life satisfaction
No crisis 3.312
(0.659)
3.046
(0.593)
0.266*
2.2e-16 
790.25
Crisis
3.207
(0.714)
2.837
(0.715)
-0.103*
2.2e-16 785.27
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=11030.  
Table 5.2b: Trust and life satisfaction in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
p-value t-value
No treatment 0.526
(0.499)
0.494
(0.500)
0.032* 1.616e-05 4.315
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High 
unemployment 0.400
(0.489)
0.466
(0.498)
0.097* 2.2e-16 12.982
GDP recession
 
0.453
(0.498)
0.323
(0.468)
-0.098* 2.2e-16 -16.708
Life satisfaction
No treatment 3.331
(0.654)
3.049
(0.649)
0.281 2.2e-16 1326.6
High 
unemployment
3.270
(0.655)
3.149
(0.660) 0.160 2.2e-16 750.1
GDP recession 
3.359
(0.649)
2.982
(0.714)
-0.094 2.2e-16 1400.6
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=101205.
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Appendix F
Complete table of balance improvement after optimal matching 
Percent balance 
improvement Mean difference eQQ median eQQ mean eQQ max
Distance 23.0922 14.4681 23.0955 18.9362
Christian Democracy -17.6968 0.0000 -17.7215 0.0000
Conservative 77.4184 0.0000 77.4167 0.0000
Liberal 52.2806 0.0000 52.3066 0.0000
Social democracy 86.2571 0.0000 86.2500 0.0000
Left-right 64.2280 0.0000 64.2689 0.0000
State-market -9.7779 0.0000 -9.7769 0.0000
Unemployment 32.0622 34.3747 32.0568 0.0000
GDP growth 27.3099 45.0980 24.9587 0.0000
Life satisfaction 27.4929 0.0000 27.4934 0.0000
Results from analysis on data after optimal matching 
The impact of political ideology and crisis on trust and life satisfaction
Table 5.3a: Trust and life satisfaction for respondents living under conditions of economic crisis
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
p-value t-value
No crisis 0.510
(0.499)
0.605
(0.489)
-0.094* 2.094e-14 -7.6926
Crisis 0.196
(0.397)
0.287
(0.452)
-0.039* 1.455e-15 -8.0045
Life satisfaction
No crisis 3.312
(0.659)
3.046
(0.593)
0.266*
2.2e-16 
790.25
Crisis
3.207
(0.714)
2.837
(0.715)
-0.103*
2.2e-16 785.27
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=11030.  
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Table 5.3b: Trust and life satisfaction in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden
Trust Centre-right 
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
p-value t-value
No treatment 0.526
(0.499)
0.494
(0.500)
0.032* 1.616e-05 4.315
High 
unemployment 0.400
(0.489)
0.466
(0.498)
0.097* 2.2e-16 12.982
GDP recession
 
0.453
(0.498)
0.323
(0.468)
-0.098* 2.2e-16 -16.708
Life satisfaction
No treatment 3.331
(0.654)
3.049
(0.649)
0.281 2.2e-16 1326.6
High 
unemployment
3.270
(0.655)
3.149
(0.660) 0.160 2.2e-16 750.1
GDP recession 
3.359
(0.649)
2.982
(0.714)
-0.094 2.2e-16 1400.6
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=101205.
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Appendix G
Complete table of balance improvement after subclass- matching 
Percent balance 
improvement
Mean difference eQQ median eQQ mean eQQ max
Distance 88.3390 85.0024 87.1746 83.2211
Christian Democracy 53.1823 0.0000 -32.5683 0.0000
Conservative 32.4896 0.0000 -197.2920 0.0000
Liberal 79.0844 0.0000 -163.2183 0.0000
Social democracy -381.8272 0.0000 -2764.8370 0.0000
Left-right 77.9423 0.0000 -289.3277 0.0000
State-market 70.5829 0.0000 -8.3435 0.0000
Unemployment 84.9414 96.3618 71.5526 62.5952
GDP growth 94.9116 53.7001 -14.8012 -102.2003
Life satisfaction 81.8527 0.0000 81.8455 67.1871
The subclass-matching did not render enough observations to report results from the DID-analysis. 
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Appendix H
Liberal parties 
Table 5.4a Trust and life satisfaction in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden
Trust Liberal
governments
Social democratic 
governments
DID 
(a-c)-(b-d)
p-value t-value
No treatment 0.485
(0.498)
0.494
(0.500)
-0.010* 2.31e-07 -5.1764
High 
unemployment
0.461
(0.498)
0.466
(0.498)
-0.005 0.341 0.9522
GDP recession
 
0.515
(0.499)
0.323
(0.468)
-0.202* 2.2e-16 -23.1922
Life satisfaction
No treatment 3.471
(0.637)
3.049
(0.649)
0.421 2.2e-16 1887.2
High 
unemployment 3.2037
(0.679)
3.149
(0.660)
0.367 2.2e-16 380.57
GDP recession 3.418
(0.635)
2.982
(0.714)
-0.013 2.2e-16 1566.3
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=140858.
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Appendix I
Results from analysis  using a binary operationalisation of the variable life satisfaction (0-1)
Life satisfaction Liberal
governments
Social democratic 
governments DID 
(a-c)-(b-d) p-value t-value
No treatment 0.91513039
(0.278)
0.89008322
(0.312)
-0.0615* 2.2e-16  9.9219
Crisis 0.88097846
(0.323)
0.78872298
(0.408)
0.0250 *  2.2e-16 10.6214
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=11030.  
Full sample 
Life satisfaction Liberal
governments
Social democratic 
governments DID 
(a-c)-(b-d) p-value t-value
No treatment 0.922
(0.267)
0.853
(0.354)
0.068* 2.2e-16 13.869
High 
unemployment 0.917
(0.276)
0.883
(0.321)
0.036* 2.2e-16 -11.243
GDP recession 0.930
(0.255)
0.810
(0.392)
-0.094* 2.2e-16 9.922
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001. Standard deviation in parentheses. N=101205.
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